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LEGISLATIVL

TAX-EXEMPT ION CONTRACTS.

I.

The Question Stated.

The sovereignty of the state is essentially indivisible and inalienable.

In the last analysis it re-

poses in the people themselves.
a single individual.

It may be granted to

It may be delegated to public

representatives.

It may be lodged in co-ordinate branch

es of government.

Two or more states may even by mutu-

al consent yield the exercise of specified powers to a
joint government, and thereby limit the extent, though
not the content, of their individual sovereignty.

But

in all these cases the incidents of sovereignty are
given into the hands of public officers, and the same
power that granted may revoke .
ereignty remains until recalled.
ceivable that these

Once lodged, the sovIn no case is it con-

temporary trustees can transmit

to others the trust that they have received,

or give,

grant or barter away any of its essential powers.

2

In our modern representative governments this principle is practically conceded.
tial

Whatever is non-essen-

or incidental may be the subject

of legislative

gift or contract, but whatever is essential and of the
essence

of sovereignty is lodged permanently in th e peo-

ple and can be disturbed only with their consent.
one legislature, by gift or contract,

If

attempt to dis-

pose of any of these essentials, no right vests in the
beneficiary other than the

right of present enjoyment

subject to the pleasure of the same or a subsequent
islature.

leg-

Blackstone has stated the rule broadly that

"Acts of Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not," putting the rule upon
the ground that "the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute
authority."

(1 Black. Com. 90.)

And the rule is

equally sound under our republican form of government,
subject only to the limitation that the legislature is

0
See also Perchard vs. Hleyward, K.B.,8 T.R., 458, a tax case
in which it is said ; "It cannot be contended that a
subsequent act of parliament will not control the provision of a prior statute, if it were intended to have
that operation".

not,

like the British parliamcnt, an omnipotent

body,

but is amenable always to the constitution, and must
act within the well defined limits
But nowhere

in

any

instrument.

of that
is

American constitution

there

to be

found any authority under which a legislature can barter
away the
the

essentials of sovereignty.

The founders of

Republic would have stood amazed at any proposition

looking to that end.

While individual States were ask-

ed to yield up certain of the incidents of sovereignty
to be exercised in their behalf by a superior government

of which they were

minished vigor all
ed.

rights

a part,

they

retained in

undi-

and power not expressly grant-

These they exercised within their respective ju-

risdictions with the same absolute freedom and under the
same political sanction as if wholly independent states.
And these,
separate

or such of these

political

existence,

as are essential

to their

they cannot dispose of or

in any way abridge, and still remain sovereign states.
While the rule is

thus broad and inclusive

there

has been in one particular a wide and dangerous departure from it

in the course of American jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court of the United States has established
and thus far maintained the doctrine that

a

State

can

by contract yield for a term of years or forever its
It is conceded that

right of taxation.

bind itself to an irrevocable contract
ercise

for the non-ex-

of the right of police or of eminent

ers certainly not more
the

it cannot thus

important or of higher rank in

scale of sovereign attributes
It

taxation.

may,

domain, pow

therefore,

than the right

of

well be asked on what

theory and by wha. process of reasoning the courts have
come to establish this one notable exception to so
sweeping a rule.

To point out the

origin of the doc-

-.
trine of irrevocable tax-exemption.contracts, the reasoning upon which it rests, the opposition with which
it has been received, and the limitations with which
it

has been hedged about,

will

be the

object

of this

paper.

II
Legislative Contracts in General.

In the absence of constitutional restrictions a
State

legislature

would wield such absolute

be able to make and break

contracts

at will.

follows naturally from the character of the
power.

sway as to
This
legislative

It was, indeed, questioned by the eminent jur-

Chief, Justice Marshall, "Whether the nature

ist,

ety and of government
the

does not prescribe

legislative power,"

breath that the

but he

some

of soci-

limit to

concedes in the

same

problem is practically insoluble..

(Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135. )
Col.lege vs. Woodward (4 Wheat.

In Dartmouth

b18, 643) he says

: "Ac-

cording to the theory of the British constitution, their
Parliament is omnipotent", and
420.)

(5 Wheat.

in Owings vs. Speed

he refused to protect the beneficiary of

a legislative grant from the operation of a subsequent
act divesting suc-h beneficiary of his title under the
grant, and placed the decision on the ground that previous to the adoption of the
was no check on the
ture.

Federal Constitution there

supreme power of a State legisla-

Other decisions in the

affirmed the sane doctrine.

(League vs. De Young 11

may be broadly asserted that

a legis-

lature, untrammeled by constitutional checks,

is prac-

How. 185.)

It

Federal Courts have re-

tically omnipotent.
It next becomes important to inquire
if

any,

to make,

have

what checkp,

been placed upon the power of a legislature

enforce, or revoke contracts.

It is not

our

6
purpose to deal with such restraints as have been imposed in State constitutions, but

only with the

clause of

the Federal Constitution under which acts of State

1-g-

islatures relating to contracts have been repeatedly
annulled.

The first

clause of the tenth seution of

Article 1. of the ConstitTution of the
provides that

"No State

United States

shall ... pass any bill of at-

tainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obliUnder this clause there has

gation of contracts."
grown up a series

of judicial decisions remarkable not

only for their great

learning but also for the

incalcula-

ble effect that they have had upon important public and
private interests.

And it is to t'cse that we must

look for the law in restraint of legislative action concerning contracts.
The phrase,

"impairing the obligation of contracts,"

is attributed, upon just what authority is uncertain,
to Judge Wilson, a Scottish lawyer profoundly learned in
the

civil law and one of the ablest members of the Con-

stitutional Convention.

It was first proposed in the

convention to adopt a somewhat similar clause from the
Ordinances for the Government of the
ry, which provided that

North-West Territo-

"in the just preservation of

7
rights and property, it is understood and declared, that
no law ought ever to be made, or have force in said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere
with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona
fide and without fraud, previously formed."

This prop-

osition did not meet with favor, and the clause as it
now stands was finally adopted.
Just what the co.nvention meant to guard against in
making this phrase a part of the fundamental law, has
been the subject of much learned discussion.

The sub-

ject was scarcely mentioned during the heated controversy
that followed the completion of the work of the convention.

It is referred to but twice in The Federalist,

once by Hamilton in No. VII of that famous collection,
and once by Madison in No. XLIV.

When it first came

up for interpretation by the Supreme Court the journal
of the convention and the LMadison papers yet lay in manuscript and were inaccessible

; Judge Wilson, its prob-

able author,was dead ; and the court, to quote Chief
Justice Marshall, decided the question from "the meaning
of words i-n common use."

Probably the court employed

the best resources at its command, but the student of
our judicial history will, in the light of subsequent

8
events, read with some surprise the able Chief Justice's
assertion that "it would seem difficult to substitute
words which are more intelligible or less liable to misand that

construction,"

"the words of the constitution

are express, A, and incapable

of being misunderstood."

(Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197. )

From all

the evidence thus far adduced, it seems altogether probable that

the

framers of the constitution

meant

simply

to place a prohibition upon State legislation impairing
the obligation of private
civil cases the

contracts, and to set up in

same safeguard as is provided in crimi-

nal cases by the clause forbidding the passage of ex
post facto laws.

Eut whatever the intention of the

authors of the clause,

the courts gave to

it

so elastic

an interpretation as to bring within its scope all contracts, executed and executory, private and legislative.
The question of legislative
up with reference

to a grant

contracts

first

came

of land made by the State

of Georgia to private individuals and afterwards revoked
on the ground that the grant had been obtained by
Chief

fraud.

Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court

OSee Shirley's

The Dartmouth College

Causes,

pp.

213 22R.

9
and settled once

for all these propositions

by.State is a contract

:

(1) a grant

; (2) a contract with a State is

within the prohibition of the clause of the constitution
forbidding a State to pass any law impairing the
gation of contracts.

obli-

(Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.)

This doctrine of irrevocable legislative grants was
after fully re-affirmed.

soon

(Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch

43 ; Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, 9 Cranch 335. )
From the doctrine

of irrevocable

grants of corporeal

property, the court passed to that of the irrevocable
grant

of franchises.

Charters of incorporation were

held to be contracts within the
tution

and to be

making power.

intent

beyond the future

of the

consti-

control of the law-

This doctrine was first enunciated in

the now famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College vs.
519. ),

Woodward. (4 Wheat.
affirmed.

and has been repeatedly re-

(Planters', Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301

Binghamton Bridge,
Citizens Gas Co.,

; Thu

3 Wall. 73 ; Louisville Gas Co. vs.
115 U. S. 683.)

Thus under this

clause of the constitution,

in-

tended doubtless for the protection of private contracts
from legislative interference, there grew up the doctrine

that a

legislature

can make a

contract

so binding

10
as completely to tie the hands of all subsequent legislatures, so immovable that
amended, or repealed.

it can never be disturbed,

The result has been far from

favorable to public interests.
warrant

Established without

of precedent or tradition, the doctrine has be-

come so settled and stringent in its application, so
comprehensive and far-reaching in its scope, that under
its protection, to quote the words of one of the ablest
of modern commentators, "the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created

; some of

the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at

large than the States to

which they owe their corporate existence.

Every pri-

vilege granted or conferred,-

no matter by what means or

on what pretence - being made

inviolable by the consti-

tution, the government is frequently stripped of its
authority in very important particulars, by unwise, careless,

or corrupt legislation ; and a clause of the feder-

al constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just
petuates the evil."
tions, 4th ed.,

contracts, protects and per-

(Cooley's Constitutional Limita-

p. 340, note)

ently, in no respect

As we

shall see pres-

is this unwise legislation more

ii
frequent or pernicious than in the granting of tax-examption contracts,

and one of the Justices of the Supreme

Court has borne witness that
tract cases that
of

ib

is

this

class of con-

"most frequently calls for the exercise

EtheirJsupervi-sory

power".

(Murray vs. Charleston,

96 U. S. 432.)

III,
Irrevocable Tax-Exemption Contracts.

The

case of the

State of New Jersey vs. Wilson,

(7 Cranch 164) decided in 1812, is the first of a long
line of cases dealing with legislative
taxation.

as to

The circumstance of the case were briefly

as follows.
ed their

contracts

The Delaware Indians had,

in 1758, yield-

claim to certain portions of New Jersey under

an agreement by which they were to be forever
in the possession of a tract

of land of about

secured
three

thousand acres to be purchased for their use and to be
exempted fron taxation.
until

They resided on this tract

1801 when the remnant

of the trie

secured the

passage of an act whereby they were empowered to sell the
land and migrate to an Indian

settlement

in

New York.

This enabling act contained no provision whatever on
The lands were sold in com-

the subject of taxation.
pliance with the act,

and pasned into the possession of

private individuals.

Soon afterward the legislature

repealed the provision of the act
taxation,

and efforts

prescribed taxes.
to test
the

of 1758 relating to

were made to levy and collect the
The owners of the land brought

the validity

of the

repealing

act,

and,

suit

after

courts of New Jersey had decided adversely to them,

carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States where

it

was submitted without argument.

Justice Marshall

read the opinion of' the court

Chief
re-affirm-

ing the doctrine of Fletcher vs. Peck that the constitutional prohibition extends to contracts
is a party
holding that

to which a State

as well as to contracts between individuals
the act

of 1758 constituted a

contract,

and

that the privilege of exemption from taxation was annexed to the lands and not
tors
not

to the persons of the proprie-

; and deciding that as the
insist

on thie surrender

State of New Jersey did

of this

privilege in

the en-

abling act of 1801, the purchasers under that act acquired all the
Delawares.

privileges and immunities enjoyed by the

The subsequent act intended to annul this

13
exemption was therefore adjudged unconstitutional

on the

ground that it impaired the obligation of the original
contract.
Whatever may be thought of the other cases held to
fall

within the prohibitory

there

clause concerning

contracts,

can be no question but that this involved conse-

quences of the gravest character, and gave

form to a

series of judicial decisions that have met with'strong
and well grounded opposition.
first time in the history

It was probably the

of jurisprudence that the

sovereign power of taxation had been adjudged the proper subject-matter of contract.

So imperative a neces-

sity exists for the exercise of this power, that
of the very essence of political autonomy.

it is

To hold

that one legislature can forever bind the State to the
non-exercise of this prerogative, is to hold that the
legislature can destroy the
the means of existence.

State, by taking from it

It will be shown later how the

Supreme Court shrank from the logical consequences of
its

own decision,

and how sundry of the judges refused

further assent to so dangerous and irrational a doctrine.
Fortunately we are

not left

in

doubt as to the at-

titude

of the

present

court toward this

tax-exemption contracts.

leading

In 1885 exactly the

state of facts came before the court.

case

on

same

It appears that

for a long period of years after the decision in 11cw Jersey vs. Wilson, the

exempt tract content-

owners of the

ed themselves with the

right to an extraordinary

lege and failed to insist upon its exercise.
the

privi-

But after

lapse of sixty years some owner of a portion of the

exempt land again asserted his right to

immunity from

taxation, and refused to pay his assessments.

This led

to the important determination to be found in Given vs.
Wright, 117 U. S. 648.
for the court

in

that

Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking
case,

says

:

"TWe do not feel disposed to question the decision
in New Jersey vs. Wilson.
It has been referred to and
relied on in so many cases from the day of its rendition
down to the present time, that it would cause a shock to
our constitutional jurisprudence to disturb it now.
If
the question were a new one
we might regard the reasoning of the New Jersey judges as entitled
to a great deal
of weight, especially since the emphatic declarations
made by this court in Providence Bank vs. Billings, 4 Pe;.
514, msd other cases, as to the necessity of having the
clearest legislative expression in order to impair the
taxing power of the State."
"The question, then, will
be whether the long acquiescence of the land owners under the imposition of
taxes, raises a presumption that the exemption, which
once existed, has been surrendered."
And on this

last

ground,

thus painfully

sought

out

stand undisturbed, the

that the leading case might
court decides that,

as the

original exemption was a

franchise and as taxes have been assessed and paid for
sixty

years the non-user of the

franchise for that

amounts to "presumptive proof of its abandonment

period

or sur-

render."
While the decision in New Jersey vs. Wilson was
thus open to criticism, its full

significance was no;

seen until another, and more famous case, had been adjudicated in the highest court of the Republic.
The decision in The Dartmouth College Case gave to
the tax-exemption contract doctrine an instant and tremendous importance.
declared that

That decision, as everybody knows,

the charter of a private

corporation is a

contract and within the protection of the constitution
of the United States.

The

inevitable conclusion fol-

lowed that an exemption from taxation contained in a
charter creating a corporation, is a part of such charter and partakes of its inviolability.
seen by those interested that

a rule

It was speedily

of law which was

adopted to protect a deserving charity could be as
easily invoked to protect a moneyed corporation or a
greedy monopoly.

Corporations have been swift to avail

themselves of this knowledge.

Under the aegis of

The Dartmouth College Case the most

oppressive monopo]lCS

have sheltered themselves from the legislative action of
the very power to whose indulgence they owe their existence.

Attempts of legislatures to cut off or of

courts to curb the dangerous exercise of corporate franchises have
cision

invariably been met by an appeal to this de-

; and it is not too much to say that

may justly claim the
Magna Charta.

corporations

famous document as their historic

The words of Chief Justice Richardson

in reading the opinion of the New Hampshire court have,
after the lapse of seventy years, almost the ring of
prophecy

;

"If the charter of a public institution, like that
of Dartmouth College, is to be construed as a contract
within the intent of the Constitution of the United
States, it will, in our opinion, be difficult to
say
what powers, in relation to their public institutions,
if any, are left to the State.
It is a construction,
in our view, repugnant to the very principles of all
government, because it places all public institutions
of all the States beyond legislative control."
(Farrar's
Report of the Case of Dartmouth College, etc., p. 230. )
In the face of all of these considerations the
Supreme Court held the charter of a corporation a more
sacred thing than the sovereignty of a people.

All

Englisli law aid precedents were thrust aside.

In

Engl tnd the

right

of parliament

to dissolve a corpora-

tion or to amend its charter had never been successfully questioned.

(1 Blk. Com. 485 ; 2 Kyd

The creature of law,

on Corp. 447)

owing its life to the

breath of

legislative or royal favor, it was amenable throughout
its existence to
poration,-

its creator.

The most

powerful cor-

like that known as the East India Company,-

yielded their charter rights and even their corporate
life

at

the will

of parliament.

But in the United

States another doctrine was solemnly promulgated.
ing corporations, the term of whose life was not
by t leir charter
mortality.

might truly

claim the

States were warned that

if

attribute

Exist
fixed
of im-

they wished to

maintain any control over future corporations, they must
do so by reserving t: at right
granted.
constitution

in

all

charters thereafter

In a word, the attempt of the framers of the
to protect

the

sanctity

of contracts had

been broadened into a foundation for the most obnoxious
monopolies.
The case of the
Ohio vs. Knoop

Piqua Branch of the State Bank of

( 16 How. 369) is of great

importance as

containing the first thorough discussion of all questions involved in legislative tax-exemption contracts.

The State of Ohio had in 1845 passed a general banking
act,

one provision of which was that each banking comnpa-

ny organized under the act should semi-annually set
six per cent.

on its

net

to which the company

or the

otherwise be subject.
under this act
ed an act

profits

in

lieu

of all

off

taxes

stockholders therein would

The Piqua Branch was organized

in 1847.

In 1851 the

legislature pass-

"to tax banks, and bank and other stocks, the
',

same as property

is

now taxable

by

the

laws of the State.

A tax was levied upon the Piqua Branch Bank under this
act and upon the bank's
brought

refusing payment,

suit was

by the State for its enforcement.

The bank

set up as a defence that the tax imposed was in violation of its charter.
tained the validity
ed to the

'he Supreme Court
of the tax,

Supreme Court of the

and the

of Ohio suscase was appeal-

United States.

decision was given in favor of the bank, the

Here a
opinion

being read by Mr. Justice M'Lean, the sole survivor, as
he pathetically remarks in the

course of his opinion,

of the famous bench of judges of which Eiarshall and
Story were leading lights.

The opinion is learned and

exhaustive,

spirit

lier

conceived

decisions,

in

the

of Marshall's

and buttressed with much of that

eargreat

19
master's

invincible logic.

ed in Gordon vs.

Appeal

It had previously been decid

Tax Court

( 3 How. 133. ) that an

annual bonus in lieu of taxation, fixed by the charter
of a banking corporation and accompanied by a pledge not
to tax such such corporation beyond the extent
bonus, was a contract
ing in favor of the
of the corporate

binding on the State

of the

and operat-

stockholders personally as well as

capital.

In the case now under consid-

eration there was no pledge that such annual per cent.

of

profits should be forever accepted in lieu of other tax
nor did the question of individual taxation of stockholders come before the court.

The majority of the

court, concurring with Mr. Justice

M'Lean, held that

the law of 1845 created a contract binding on the banks
established under it and on the

State;

and that Lhe act

of 1851 impaired the obligation of that contract and
was therefore unconstitutional and void.
The feature of the opinion which must make it of
lasting interest to all students of this subject,

is the

argument that a State, in granting an irrevocable exemption

from taxation does not

sovereign power.

relinquish a part of its

The learned Justice

says

:

"The assumption that a State, in exempting certain property from taxation, relinquishes a certain part
of its sovereign power is unfounded.
The taxing power
may select its
objectS of taxation; and this
is generally
regulated by the amount necessary to answer the purposes of the State.
Now the exemption of property frun
taxation is a question of policy and not of power."
(16 How. 384)
And again

s

"A State in granting privileges to a bank, with a
view of offording a sound currency or of advancing any
policy connected with the public interest, exercises its
sovereignty, and for a public purpose, of which it is
the exclusive judge.
. .
.
This act so far from
parting with any
portion of its sovereignty, is an exercise of it.
Can any one deny this power to the legislature ? rHas it not a right to select the objects of
taxation and to determine the amount ? To deny either
of these, is to take away State sovereignty."
(16 How.
389.)
This argument
tally weak.

is specious but it seems to us, fa-

It is true that

the exemption of property

from taxation is a question of policy.

It

is equally

true that the legislature may and should exempt property
from taxation whenever there is a sound reason for so
doing.

The encouragement

of religion and morals, the

advancement of education, even, as the learned Justice
suggests, the providing for a sound currency,- all these
objects and many more may justify a legislature in
granting exemptions from taxation.

And it is true,

likewise, that a legislature in so doing does not part

with any portion of its sovereignty.

Anglo-Saxon leg-

islatures in all ages have done these very things.
always, and everywhere, save under the judicial

-ut

inter-

pretations of our own court, such grants have been made
with the understanding that

they could

be recalled

the needs or policy of the state might dictate.
.slaure

in exempting

as

A

-g-

church property from taxation

parts with no portion of the

State sovereignty ; but a

legislature that attempts to exempt the same property
forever from taxation does attempt
of the State sovereignty.

to part with a portion

The sovereign power of tax-

ation is the absolute power to tax every kind and all
of every kind of property within the jurisdiution of
the taxing power.

Anything less

thing less than sovereighty.
ture

than this

is

some-

Therefore the legisla-

of Ohio did not part with any portion of the sov-

ereignty of that

State

in accepting a per cent.

its in lieu of Taxabion, but

on prof-

it did part with a portion

of the sovereignty in binding all subsequent legislatures to accept the same arrangement.
It is easy to see that such a doctrine might be
carried to the verge of state
instance,

in

the case

suicide.

of New Jersey vs.

Suppose, for
Wilson cited

22
above, that a great city with a million inhabitants had
grown up within the

limits of the exempt land.

These

citizens, together with millions of property, would have
been forever free from taxation for State purposes in
virtue of an arrangement with the Delaware Indians made
If banks may be

over a hundred years ago.

exempted from

taxation, so may railroads, and manufactories, and farms,
and property of every description ; and it needs only a
corrupt and worthless legislature

in order to tie for-

ever the taxing power of the State in regard to the most
interests.

extensive private

The exigencies of a State

As well might a legislature s -y

can never be foreseen.

that a certain piece of property shall forever be exempt
from the possibility of lawful seizure under the right
of eminent

dom,in,

as to say that

exempt from taxation.

it

shall

forever be

A contract could be madeand a

consideration paid, in one case as well as in another.
But

such a law would be no more a contract than would a

law forever yielding the right of the State to exercise
the police power

over the

same

property.

A legislature

may always select the objects of taxation and determine
the amount,

it may, from considerations of public policy,

exempt certain kinds of property from all taxation wlat-
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ever, it may consent to receive a fixed amount in lieu
of regular taxation, but it

cannot, without yielding up

sovereign attributes, make a binding contract,
term of years

or forever,

the

for a

subject 10 matter of which

is the power to tax.
As will be pointed out more in detail later, a
strong minority of the court took this view of the

case

and dissented strongly from the doctrine of the prevailing opinion.
The case just under consideration was deuided in
1853.

From that time down to the present moment the

question has returned again and again to trouble the
court, and will continue so to return until an indispensible prerogative

of sovereignty

is

vindicated against
is needless to

the strength of blind precedent.

It

traverse the ground covered by the

later decisions fur-

ther than to point out the extent to which the doctrine
has been carried.
Two important cases,-The House
vs.

Rouse

vs. Rouse

of the Friendless

(8 Wall. 430) and The Washington University
(8 Wall. 439.),- may be

as both arose out
were cases where

of the

considered together,

same state of facts.

Both

charitable institutions had been char-
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tered with a provision exempting them from taxation and
had afterward been subjected to taxation by a subsequent
legislature.
says

Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the court,

:

"The validity of this contract is questioned at bar
on the ground that the legislature had no authority to
grant away the power of taxation.
The answer to this
position is, tLat the question is no longer open for
argument here, for it is settled by repeated adjudications of this court, that a State may by contract based
on a consideration, exempt the property of an individual
or corporation from taxation, either for a specified
period or permanently.
And it is equally well settled
that the exemption is prestumed to be on sufficient consideration, and binds the State if the charter containing it is accepted."
It would be difficult to find a plainer statement
of the law established by the Supreme Court of the United States

on this important question, or

come to corporate

one more wel-

interests.

To this decision there were also dissenting voices
as we shall see when we come to a fuller consideration
of the

opposition with which the doctrine

of irrevocable

tax-exemption contracts has been met.
In all subsequent cases the question has been treated as

res adjudicata,

although the

court has

from time

to time expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the established doctrine.

In the case of Willmington Railroad vs.

Reid (13 Wall. 264) and Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Company

vs.

Reid

(l: Wall.

?69)-the

question was

ed and no dissenting voices seem to have
In

the course

ever,

Mr.

of his

Justice

been heard.
case,

how-

speaking for the court,

says

opinion in

Davis,

so treat-

the former

"It may be conceded that it were better for the
interest of the State, that the taxing power, which is
of
one of the highest and most important attributes
In
sovereignty, should on no occasion be surrendered.
of government canthe nature of things the necessities
not always be foreseen, and in the changes of time, the
ability to raise revenue from every species of property
may be of vital importance to the State, but the courts
to apply the
of the country are not the proper tribunals
character.
of this
corrective to improvident legislation
on the action of
restraint
If there be no constitutional
is
no remedy, exthis
subject,
there
the legislature
on
cept through the influence of a wise public sentiment,
reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making
power."
Other cases of like character have been frequently
before the court during the

las

score

of years,

but the

decisions have been uniformly consistent with the leading cases.

(Magee vs. )athis,

son vs. Branch, 15 Wall.

460

4 Wall. 143 ; Tomlin-

; Tomlinson vs. Jessup, lb.

454 ; Humphrey vs. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244 ; Dodge vs. Woolsey 18 Ilow.
ic
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Railroad Co.,

; Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How. 384 ; Pacifvs. Mctuire, 20 Wall. 36

vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679
119 U. S. 265.)

; Farrington

; New Orleans vs. Houston,

Opposition to the

The doctrine
right

laid

down in

Doctrine.

the leading

cases on the

of one legislature to grant exemption from taxa-

tion which shall bind all subsequemt legislatures has
not been established without strong and persistent opposition.

A slight survey ofAcircumstances attending the

decision of a few of these cases will amply sustain this
proposition.
The first case, that of New Jersey vs. Wilson
(7 Cranch, 164) was submitted without argument and, as
is intimated in Given vs. Wright

(117 U. S. 648, 655)1

might have been very differently determined upon a fuller consideration of all the facts.

The questionable

nature of the subject matter of the supposed contract
in that case,

namly, the sovereign prerogative of tax-

ation, does not

seem to have occurred to Chief Justice

Marshall ; at any rate it receives no attention in his
opinion.

But the subject of taxation was brought for-

cibly to his attention in the famous case of M'Culloci
vs. Maryland
ward,

(4 Wheat.

and again in

316), decided a few years after-

the case

of Osborn vs.

United States
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Bank ( 9 Wheat.

738).

in favor of the

supremacy of the laws of congress and

against

the

rights

In these cases, while

of the

states

to tax

"its

deciding

instruments

employed in the execution of its powers," he enforces the
truths that, "the power of taxation is one of vital importance"

; that

their property,

"the power of taxing the people and
is essential to the verb

existence of

government, and may be legitimately exercised on the
objects to which it

is applicable, to the

utmost

ex-

tent to which the government may choose to carry it";
that

"the people of a State give to their government

a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as
the exigencies of government
prescribe no limits

cannot be limited, they

to the exercise

ing confidently on the interest

of this

right,

rest-

of the legislator, and

on the influence of the constitaents over their representative,
428)

to guard them against

its

abuse."

(4 Wheat.

Here was a statement of principles which might

have carried the learned Chief Justice to a different
decision in New Jersey vs. Wilson, had they been clearly
before him in the consideration of that case.
before him, as we shall presently see,
tion of Providence Bank vs. Billings

They were

in the considera-

(4 Pet.

514), decid-
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ed in 1830, and doubtless did much to induce the rule of
construction in that
led the

case which has ever since control-

Supreme Court in its adjudication of tax-exemp-

tion causes.

These two cases, New Jersey vs. Wilson

and Providence Bank vs. Billings, comprise

the law as

it was established by Chief Justice Marshall and his associates, and as it has continued, practically unimpaired since their day.

But the opposition,

as already

stated, has been strong and persistent.
In the case of the State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop
(16 How. 369) three justices, Catron, Daniel and Campbell, dissented and Chief Justice Taney refused his assent to the doctrine of the controlling opinion although
he concurred in its conclusions.

Two of the justices,

Catron and Campbell wrote dissenting opinions.
dissent

The

of Mr. Justice Catron rests mainly upon ihe prop-

C
osition, boldly asserted and streuously maintained,
"that, according to the constitution of all the
states of the Union, and even of the British parliament,
the sovereign political power is not the subject of
contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter
of incorporation, and taken away from and placed beyond
the reach of, future legislatures ; that the taxing power
is a political power of the highest class, and each
successive legislature having vested in it, unimpaired,

New Jersey vs. Wilson was decided in 1812 ; l'Cullock vs. Maryland in 1819 ; and Osborn vs. U.S. Bank in /e2q,

all the political powers previous legislatures had, is
authorized to impose taxes on all property in the State
that its constitution does not exempt."
(16 How. 404)
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell
goes to the same point,

but with such firmness of logic

and with such force of statement, as to make it the
"leading opinion" among a large and increasing number of
dissenting voices on this important question of constitutional law.

A few extracts will show the nature ajd

scope of his argument.
"The powers of that assembly in general, and that
of taxation especially, are trust powers, held by them
as magistrates, in deposit, to be returned after a short
period, to their constituents, without
abuse or diminution.
"The nature of the legislative authority is inconsistent with an inflexible stationary system of administration.
Its office is one of vigilance over the varying wants and changing elements of the association, to
the end of ameliorating its condition.
"The subject matter of this section fof the law of
1845 previously referred to: is the contributive share
6f an important element of the productive capital of the
State to the support of its government.
The duty of
all to make such a contribution in the form of an equal
and apportioned taxation, is a consequence of the social
organization.
The right to enforce it is a sovereign
right, stronger than any proprietary claim to property.
The amount to be taken, the mode of collection, and the
duration of any particular assessment or form of collection, are questions of administration submitted to
the discretion of the legislative authority ; and variations must frequently occur, according to the mutable
conditions, circumstances, or policy of the State,
(16 How. 407)
We shall sei later that these sound principles of

government have since received the sanction of another
strong and determined minority of the Supreme
is

safe to say that

a

large majority

of the

Court.

It

profession

would give their assent to the propositions laid down
in

these

opinions of the minority of the court.

In an opinion given in another case at the same
term, Chief Justice Taney says that while he concurs in
the judgment

of the majority of the

court

in

State Bank

of Ohio vs. Knoop, he dissents from the reasoning on
which the decision rests.
in the following extract

His own views are explained
:

"Powers of sovereignty confided to the

legislative

body of a State are undoubtedly a trust committed to
them, to be executed to the best of their
judgment for
the public good ; and no one legislature
can, by
its
own act disarm their
successors of any of the powers
or rights
of sovereignty confided by the people to the
legislative body, unless they are authorized to do so
by the constitution
under which they are elected.
They
cannot, therefore by contract, deprive a future legislature of the power of imposing any tax4mmay be necessary for the public service- or of exercising any other
act of sovereignty confided to the legislative
body,
unless the power to make such a contract is conferred
upon them by the constitution of the State".
(The Ohio
Life Ins. & Trust Co., vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 431.)
In the case of The Home of the Friendless vs.
Rouse

(8 Wall. 430) and Washington University vs. Rouse

(8 Wall. 439) three

of the eight judges sitting strongly
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dissented from the prevailing opinion.

The three were

Chief Justice Chase and Justices Field and Miller, the
last

of whom wrote the dissenting

opinion and entered

a solemn protest against the dangerous doctrine that was
to receive a new sanction in the case at
he says,

bar.

"To hold"

"that any one of the annual legislatures can,

by contract,

deprive the

taxation,

to hold that they can destroy the govern-

is

State forever of the power of

ment which they are appointed to serve,
action in

that

regard

is

Railroad Co. vs. McGuire

strictly

and that

lawful".

In

their
Pacific

(20 Wall. 68) Justices Clifford

and Miller dissented and Chief Justice Waite put his
assent upon other grounds than that the tax emption was
a contract which a subsequent legislature could not
pair.

In Farrington vs. Tennessee

im-

(95 U. S. 679) three

judges, Strong Clifford and Field dissented from the
prevailing opinion.
trine

f

Thus it will be seen that the doc-

one legislature can forever tie up the hands

of its successors in a matter of sovereign importance,
was first *,enunciated in a case submitted without argument and decided without

investigation, was afterwards

rigidly limited by the same great jurist who promulgated
it,

and has since been repeatedly disaffirmed and re-
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jected by a strong minority of the court who are

firm in

0
the belief that the doctrine must finally be abandoned.

V
Limitations and Applications of the Doctrine.

I.

Exemption will not be presumed.

Reference has

already been made to the limitation of the doctrine of
New Jersey vs. Wilson in the
dence Bank vs.

Billings.

It

subsequent case of Proviis now necessary to point

out more specifically the nature of this limitation.
The Providence Bank was created under a charter
which contained no provision whatever on the subject

of

taxation, but authorized the bank "to employ its capital
in banking transactions for the benefit of the stockholders, and bound the State to permit these transactions and restrained it from passing any cat that would
destroy the profits of the bank.

A few years later the

legislature of Rhode Island passed an act taxing the
bank and this was resisted by the bank on the ground
that

it impaired the

in the charter.

obligation of the contract embodied

In the course of his opinion Chief

Justice Marshall says

:
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"That the taxing power is of vital importance, that
it is essential to the existence of government are truths
which it cannot be necessary to re-affirm.
They are
acknowledged and
asserted by all.
It would seem
that the relinquishment of such a power is never to be
assumed.
We will not say that
a State may not relinquish it, that a consideration sufficiently valuable to
induce a partial release of it may not exist ; but, as
the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished, that corrununity has a right to insist that
its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in
which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it
does not appear." (4 Pet. 561)
The principle enunciated in this case
affirmation and sanction in the
River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge
tion there at

issue was not

received re-

leading case of Charles
(11 Pet. 420)

The ques-

one of exemption from taxa-

tion but of exemption from competition, or in other words,
a question of monopoly.
er Bridge

The charter of the Charles Riv-

Company contained no provision as to exclusive

privileges

; afterward the legislature granted to the

Warren Bridge Company a franchise for erecting a bridge
which would, at the expiration of a few years, become a
free bridge, and thus destroy utterly the value of the
Charles River Bridge

Compan ,'s

property.

The latter

company contended that its charter contained an implied
contract

on the part of the

State not to grant to any

other person any privileges which would destroy the
value of its franchise.

On this point Chief Justice

Taney says

"

"The object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the connunity by
which it is established ; and it can never be assumed
that the goverrmient intended to diminish its power of
accomplishing the end for which it was created.
. .
The continued existence of a government would be of no
great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was
disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends
of its creation, and the functions it was designed to
perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corporations.
..
. . While the rights of private property
are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well
being of every citizen depends on t!,eir faithful preservation." (11 Pet.547,548)
The principle adopted in these two leading cases
has continued to govern the court in its subsequent
consideration of legislative grants.
ticularly concerned

As we are par-

only with grants of tax exemptions,

it will be unnecessary to do more than cite a few of the
cases of that
applied.

character in which the principle has been

Mention has already been made of Mr. Justice

Miller's complaint that the

court has "been, at times,

quick to discover a contract that it might be protected,
and slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts
were not so by reason of the want of authority in those
who profess to bind others."
Rouse,

8 Wall. 439,442. )

antly sustained by facts,

(Washington University vs.
While this charge is abund-

it is,

on the other hand,

equally

true

that the

court has been slow to discover

legislative contracts where they rest
upon implication.
doctrine

in any degree

And indeed the court has carried this

of strict construction of legislative grants to

such a length, that Mr. Justice Miller finds himself
constrained in a recent case to dissent together with
Chief Justice Waite, and Justices Field and Bradley,
from the prcvailing decision of the court.

The case

is a peculiar one and wotthy of careful study.
In 1853 the legislature of Louisaanna grahted a
charter to the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad
Company, the second section of which read as follows
"The capital stock of

:

said company shall be exempt from

taxation, and its road, fixtures, workshops, warehouses,
vehicles of transportation, and other appurtenances,
shall be exempt from taxation for ten years after the
completion of said road within the limits

of this State."

Owing to the fact that the completion of the road was
delayed by the

outbreak of the Civil War, the State

undertook to tax the property in use upon the completed
portion, and the courts were called upon for a construction of the exemption clause.
doctrine

After reiterating the

of Providence Bank vs. Billings and other
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cases to the
Mr.

Justice

same effect,
Gray,

says

the

court,

speaking through

:

OIn their natural and legal meaning, the words 'for
ten years after
the completion of said road' as distinctly exclude the time preceding the completion of the
road, as the time succeeding the ten years after its
completion.
.
.
.
To hold that the words of exemption
used by the legislature
include the time before the
completion of the road would be to insert by construction
what is not to be found in the language of the contract
to presume an intention, which the legislature
has not
manifested in clear and unmistakable terms, to surrender the taxing power ; and to go against the uniform
current of the decisions of this
court upon the subject.'
(Vicksburg,etc. R.R. Co. vs. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665. )
From this construction of the exemption clause the
four judges already mentioned dissented, and concurred
in the opinion that
the

road,

and was,

"this exemption was designed to aid
therefore,

much more

its construction than when completed.

needed during
It

seems like

a perversion of the purpose of the statute to hold that
it

intented to

impede by its burden the progress of the

desired work, and relieve
finished."

It

it of the burden only when

is significant that Justices Miller and

Tield were the only judges taking part

in t~ie decision

of the Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse and Washington
University vs. Rouse who were still on the bench when
Vicksburg etc.
the doctrine

R.R. Co. vs. Dennis was decided.

From

of irrevocable legislative tax contracts
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established by the former case they

strongly dissented.

From the severe application in the latter case of the
doctrine of strict

construction in determining the mean-

ing of such contracts they dissented with equal earnestness.

Radically opposed to the doctrine in 1869 they

find themselves the conservative members of the court
1886.

in

It is interesting, in view of these facts, to

speculate as to what would have been the attitude of the
court

in 1886 toward the whole subject

of tax exemption

contracts had it come up as a new question and not as a
res adjudicata.
The court has however been thoroughly consistent
in its avowed purpose to construfall legislative grants
strictly against the grantee and to uphold no claims
that rest

on implication.

Thus wiere one company was

invested with the powers and privileges and subjected to
the

obligations contained in certain enumerated sec-

tiohs of the charter of another, and one of the enumerated sections exempted that other company from taxation,
it was held that the exemption did not pass to the new
company.

(Railroad Company vs.

Commissioners, 103 U.S.I.)

So where by legislative enactment a railroad was to pay
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an annual bonus of $10,000 and its stock was to be assessed to the amount of the costs of construction, it
was held that subsequent legislation levying a general
tax upon the gross receipts upa

of all transportation

companies applied to this railroad, and that the original plan of taxation was not a surrender of the right
of the state to tax in any other way

it

might see fit.

(Erie Railway Company vs. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492.)

And other cases go to sustain the fixed doctrine that
"the power to tax rests upon necessity, and is inherent in every sovereignty, and there can
tion in favor of its relinquishment".
guire 22 Wall. 215, 226.

be no presump(Bailey vs. Ma-

See also Delaware Railroad

Tax, 18 Wall. 206 ; Central R.R.Co. vs. Georgia, 92 U.S.
670 ; Hoge vs. Railroad Co. 99 U.S. 348 ; Bank vs. Tennessee, 104 U.S. 493 ; Railroad Co. vs. Loftin, 105 U.S.
258 ; Memphis Gas Co. vs. Shelby Co. 109 U.S. 398 ;
Chicago etc. R.R.Co. vs. Guffey, 120 U.S. 569 ; Id. 122
U.S. 561.)

II.
Contract.

Exemption without a Consideration is not a
A

second and very important limitation of

the doctrine of irrevocable tax exemption contracts is

to be

found in

repeated

the

decisions of the

Federal

Supreme Court that an exemption which is a mere gratuity,
consideration passing from the

with no
State,

is

not a ccntract

ure of the grantor.

and is

beneficiary to the

repealable at

the pleas-

This was so decided in the leading

case of Christ Church vs. Philadelphia

( 24 How. 300.)

In 1832 the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted that
"the

real

property,

including ground rents now belong-

ing and payable to Chrict
of Philadelphia,

Church Hospital

so long as the sane shall

in the City
continue to

belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free
from taxes."

In

1851 an act was passed under which this

property became subject to taxation.

It was held that.-

"The concession of the legislature was spontaneous,
and no service or duty, or other remunerative condition,
It belongs to the cl ass
was imposed on the corporation.
It attachof laws denominated privilegia favorabilia.
property as belonged to the corpoed only to such real
property
1KzINxgiR& remained as its
ration, and while it
but it is not a necessary implication from these facts
that the concession is perpetual, or was designed to
Such an incontinue during the corporate existence.
terpretation
is not to be favored, as the power of taxation is necessary to the existence of the State, and
must be exerted according to the varying condition of
The act of 1833 belongs to a class
the Commonwealth.
of statutes in which the narrowest meaning is to be
carry out the intent of the
taken which will fairly
legislature.
"
The general statement is that such a stipulation
between individuals

"would belong to the category of

40
nude pacts.
the parties
was put

It has no higher character because one of
was a

State the other a corporation,

in the form of a statute.

22 Wall. 527, 573)

(Tucker vs. Ferguson

Such acts amount

frequently

bounty laws dictiited by public policy,and
at the will of the legislature.
the case where

a State

offeroto

and it

to mere

determinable

Such was held to be
exempt

from taxation

all real and personal property used in the manufacture
of salt,

and afterward limited the

years.

But the

san

court in

exemption to five

that casie

stated

provision been contained in a special charter,

which the

corporation had accepted amd acted upon,

would have constituted a contract.
East

Saginaw,

13 Wall.

be an irrevocable
mere gratuity
97 U.S.
It

373)

contract

In

it

(Salt Company vs.

other words what would

under a

under a general

special charter is

law.

(Welch vs.

a

Cook

541)
was this

and a gratuity

same distinction
that

cision that Mr.

(pp. 115--117)

Ijilacelnbia.

Rouse

Burroughs in

with the principle
In

between a contract

led to the majority decision in

Home of the Friendless vs.

tion

that had the

(8 Wall.

430),

his valuable work on taxa-

finds great difficulty
laid down in
te

a de-

fnrmnr ca

in

reconciling

Christ Church vs.
th

excom-

granted by special charter "for the purpose of encouraging" the establishment of a charitable institution
in the latter case it was granted because it had been
"represented that

in consequence of the decay of the

buildings of the hospital, and the increasing burdens of
taxation, its means are curtailed and its usefulness
limited."

In the

former case the corporation was in-

duced to act on the promise of exemption ; in the latter,
the

corporation was sitplyrelieved of burdens which it

was lawfully required to bear.
While this distinction may serve to
difficulties raised by

clear away the

Mr. Burroughs' objections, the

exception taken by him to Mr. Justice Davis' dictum in
the Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse that "it

is equally

well settled that the exemption is presumed to be on
sufficient

consideration,"

is certainly well grounded.

It is now an elementary principle in all these cases that
"the contract must be shown to exist,"
no presumption in its favor,"

and that "every reasonable

doubt should be resolved against
guson 2f Wall.

575) And every

that "there is

it."

( Tucker vs.

Fer-

such exemption must be

upon a consideration in order to constitute an irrevocable contract.

(Cases cited supra. West Wisccnsin Co.

42
vs.

Supervisors

93 U.S.

City Council 93 U.S.

III.

in

Company vs.

a Personal Privilege

a-id not

The general doutrine of irrevocable tax

exemption contract
itation

; lome Insurance

116.

Exemption is

Transferable.

595

has received a further important

the decision of the Supreme

Court

lim-

that such

exemption is a personal privilege, does not attach in
rem, and does not pass with the sale of the franchises
and property of the original beneficiary.

This impor-

tant question was first squarely decided in the case of
Morgan vs. Louisiana

(93 U.S. 217) which has ever since

been regarded as a leading

authority.

The legisla-

ture of Louisiana had in 1853 incorporated the Yew Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company with
a clause exempting the capital

stock from taxation for-

ever, and the works, fixtures rolling-stock and appurtenances,

for the space of ten years after

tion of the road.

the ccmple-

The road was sold in 1869 on execu-

tion aid passed into the possession of Morgan.
State afterwards

The

sued Morgan for taxes upon the road and

he sut up as a defence the exemption clause of 1853.
The question thus presented was whether, under the des-

ignation of franchises, the immunity from taxation upon
property of the road passed to the purchaser.
preme Court

decided that it

emption "was a mere
and,

therefore,

did not,

The court in the

to

Su-

but that the ex-

personal privilege of the

not transferable

The

conpany,

others."

same decision defined aad fixed

the meaning of the term "franchise", so far as such definition

was necessary in the discussion of tax exemp-

tion privileges.

It said

"The term must always be considered in connection
with the corporation or property to which it is alleged
to appertain.
The franchises of a railroad corporation are rights
or privileges which are essential
to
the operations of the corporation, and without which its
road and works would be of little value ; such as the
right to run cars, to take tolls,
to appropriate earth
and gravel for the bed of its
road, or water for its
engines, and the like.
They are positive rights or
privileges, without the possession of which the road
of the company could not be successfully worked.
Immunity from taxation is not one of them. The former may
be conveyed to the purchaser of the road as part of
the property of a company ; the latter
is personal, and
incapable of transfer without express statutory direct i on. "
The general principle enunciated in Morgan vs.
Louisiana has governed the court
judications

of the

in

questions there

all

subsequent ad-

involved,

and has

done much to limit the sweeping force of the leading
cases.

Yet this decision was not reached without a
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serious divergence from a former decision, and a divergence which has widened with the lapse of time.
former decision referred to
phrey vs. Pegues

The

is that in the case of Hum-

(16 Wall. 244)

where the court held

that a charter conferring on one company "all the powers,
rights and privileges granted by the charter" of another
company, carried with it the exemption from taxation
enjoyed by the original company.
decision with those of

subsequent

To reconcile

this

cases of a like

character, has proved a troublesome matter.

In Morgan

vs. Louisiana the distinction was placed on the ground
that while immunity from taxation might pass under the
term "privilege", it could not pass under the sale of
"franchises".

In Railroad Companies vs. Gaines (97 U.S.

697) the distinction was placed on the ground that while
immunity from taxation might pass under a general
grant of "all the powers, rights, and privileges",

it

would not pass under a similar grant limited by the
words "for the purpose of making and using
In short

the

strictest possible rule of construction

has been followed in
Louisana,

said road".

all

cases

subsequent

to Morgan vs.

and the court has uniformly refused to uphold

an alleged

immunity

from taxation where the franchises

to which the immunity was originally

attached had been

transferred.
It

may be stated as a general rule,

numerous cases, that
al privilege,

supported by

immunity from taxation is a person-

and does not attach to or run with the

property or franchise, and is not transferable unless by
a new and expressf authorization by the legislature.
(Wilson vs. Gaines 103 U.S. 417 ; R.R.Co. vs. Hamblen,
102 U.S. 273 ; R.R.Co. vs. Commissioners, 103 U.S. 1 ,
Louisville etc. R.R.Co. vs. Palmes, 109 U.S. 204 ;
Memphis R.R.Co. vs. Commissioners, ll2

U.S. 465 ; St.Lou-

is R.R.Co. vs. Berry, 113 U.S. 465 ; Chesapeake R.R.Co.
vs.

Miller,

IV.

114 U.S.

176)

Exemption of One of Two Consolidated Corna-

nies does not Exempt Both.
is

presented in

solidated,

those

cases where two companies are con-

one of which is

and the otther not.

A new phase of the question

by law exempt

from taxation

Of course here, as elsewhere, the

plainly expressed intent of the legislature
the new company formed by the consolidation,
tirely conclusive.

to exempt
will be en-

But in the absence of any statutory

provisions,

the rules of construction

the courts will
It
are

may

govern.

be stated broadly that where

consolidated,

under its

laid down by

two companies

each of which was exempt

original charter,

from taxation

the new company will also

be exempt unless the act authorizing the consolidation
provides

otherwise.

In

129)

(Tennessee vs. Whitworth, 1.7 U.S.

such a case the presumption is

company takes all

the

powers and privileges which were

possessed by the two original
of their

union,

ly by proving a

that the new

corporations

at

the time

and this

presumption can be rebutted on-

contrary

intention

on the part of the

legislature.
In

case one

of the consolidated capanies was ex-

empt and the other not,
solidation provides that
shall

possess all

and the act authorizing

con-

the consolidated companies

the rights and privileges which each

of the companies enjoyed under its
tion from taxation extends
aggregated

the

charter,

the exemp-

only to thFat portion of the

property which was,

at the time of the union,

exempt under the charter

of the favored company.

Wil. & Balt.

daryland, 10 How. 377 ; Tomlin-

R.R.Co. vs.

son vs. Branch, 15 Wall. 460 ; Delaware

R.R.Tax,

(Phil.

18 Wall.

206

; Central R.R.Co. vs.

Georgia, 92 U.S. 665 ; Chesa-

peake & O.R.R.Co. vs. Virginia, 94 U.S. 718 ; Railroad
Co. vs. Maine, 96 U.S. 499 ; Green Co. vs.

Conness,

109

U.S. 104) But even in such a case, the rule must be
taken with the qualification

that

the new company possess-

es such transferred powers, privileges and immunities,
only so far as they can be exercised and enjoyed by
it,

with its

tion.

different

(R.R.Co.

vs.

officers and distinct
Maine,

96 U.S.

499,

509.)

constituWherever

the new corporation is not so constituted as nvsk to
perform the condition precedent

to exemption or commu-

tation of taxation, it can lay no claim to such privilege.

VI
The Tendency of the Court.

From this brief survey of the law of legislative taxexemption contracts,

it

been a marked change

in popular, and even judicial,

opinion since the

must be evident that there has

cases of New Jersey vs. Wilson and

Dartmouth College vs. Woodward were given to the world.
At that time corporations were few in number and of inconsiderable importance.

Sincd then there has been a
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remarkable increase

in the number of corporations and a

constant growth of corporate power.

The exercise of

such power in the corrupting of legislators and the procuring of legislation favorable to corporations and dangerous to public interests, and the alarming combinations
and "trusts" which have been formed within the past
years,,have justly excited public discussion as to the
control of these bodies.

It is altogether probable that

this discussion will increase rather than diminish during
the next score of years, and that the principles stated
in the preceding pages will be again and again argued in
the

courts and before the people.
That the Supreme

of a more stringent

Court is alive to the necessity

control of corporations may be clear-

ly gathered from a study of the decisions in the
house Cases"

(94 U.S. 113), the"Granger Cases"

155, 164, 179, 180, 181
Commission Cases",

"Ware-

(94 U.S.,

; 108 U.S. 526), the"Railroad

(116 U.S. 307, ) and Spring Valley

Water Works Co. vs. Schotter (110 U.S. 347).

So far

has the court gone in these cases in order to leave the
legislature free to control corporations, that a strong
minority of the

court and the great body of the profes-

sion have been unable to reconcile the cases with the
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principles
It

is

laid down in
safe to say

Dartmouth College vs.
that this

Woodward.

tendency will

continue.

It may even happen, at a not very remote contingency,
that the court will depart utterly from the doctrine of
the leading case.

There are not wanting those who think

that it has already gone far in that direction.

But

whatever may be the outcome as to general questions involved in

charter rights,

it

has been predicted by a

very eminent authority- Mr. Justice Miller- that the
court will finally

abandon altogether the

the taxing power

can be restricted or destroyed by ex-

emptions contained in corporate charters:
While such a

doctrine that

reversal

(8 Wall. 444

of the leading cases would un-

doubtedly give an unpleasant shock to our judicial system it may well be a matter of serious reflection whether,

after

all,

government and

it

would not be

in the interests of good

an enlightened public policy.

